








Optimal Income Taxation with Uncertain 








CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 3654 







An electronic version of the paper may be downloaded  
• from the SSRN website:              www.SSRN.com 
• from the RePEc website:              www.RePEc.org 




Optimal Income Taxation with Uncertain 





We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability 
and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial 
literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of uncertainty has evolved since Mirrlees’ 
original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more 
limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are 
due to uncertainty alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under 
uncertainty when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and 
interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance and incentive effects. The case of ex ante 
identical households and the no-risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special 
cases. 
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Redistributive income taxation serves to mitigate the social welfare consequences of market-
generated inequalities in earnings. These inequalities can be characterized as having two diﬀerent
sources. As emphasized in the traditional optimal income tax literature following from Mirrlees
(1971), they can be a result of diﬀerences in the endowed ability or productivity of households.
The inability of the government to observe each household’s ability constrains the benevolent gov-
ernment from achieving a ﬁrst-best outcome, and limits considerably the progressivity of the tax
system. Alternatively, as Varian (1980) and Tuomala (1984) studied, inequality might be a result
of uncertainty in the earnings obtained from a given eﬀort. In the absence of market-provided
earnings insurance, the income tax system acts as a social insurance device, albeit an imperfect
one because of the inability of the government to observe individual eﬀort, a sort of moral haz-
ard. Here, too, progressivity will be compromised by imperfect information. If the government
were fully informed and uncertainty was the only source of inequality, the tax system would mimic
full insurance and have 100 percent marginal tax rates, which would be highly progressive indeed.
The inability to observe individual eﬀort precludes that, and, as in the optimal income tax case,
constrains progressivity considerably.1
The design of optimal redistributive taxation to address ability diﬀerences and to address
earnings uncertainty have largely been studied separately. The former literature is vast, and is
summarized in Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980), Tuomala (1990), Myles (1995) and Kaplow (2008).
Given the complexity of the modeling, simulation techniques are usually relied on to shed light
on the optimal income tax structure. They typically result in optimal marginal tax rates that are
relatively constant except at the two ends of the ability distribution, where they fall to zero.
The literature on optimal income taxation to deal with earnings uncertainty is much more
limited, and has generally assumed away ability diﬀerences. Thus, Tuomala (1984) and Low and
Maldoom (2004) assume that all households are ex ante identical, so supply the same amount
of labor, but diﬀer in earnings because of some innate idiosyncratic uncertainty that is resolved
after labor is supplied. Tuomala’s (1984) simulation analysis seems to indicate that the optimal
degree of progressivity to address earnings uncertainty is qualitatively comparable to that found by
Mirrlees (1971) (and conﬁrmed by Tuomala 1990) to address earnings inequality arising from ability
diﬀerences. Low and Maldoom show how the degree of progressivity reﬂects a trade-oﬀ between
an insurance eﬀect, which favors progressivity in the sense of increasing marginal tax rates, and
1 A third source of earnings inequality we do not consider arises from diﬀerences in preferences for work
among households. This raises diﬃcult issues with respect to how social preferences should treat per-
sons with diﬀerent preferences, summarized in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006, 2007). Diﬀerent views
on that can change redistribution policy signiﬁcantly, as illustrated in Boadway, cuﬀ and Marchand
(2000) and Cuﬀ (2000).
1an incentive eﬀect, which works against such progressivity. There is no general presumption that
on balance marginal tax rates will be increasing. Cremer and Gahvari (1999) also assume ex ante
identical individuals facing uncertain wages where the government sets redistribution, or social
insurance, policy before the uncertainty is resolved. They consider cases in which labor supply
and/or commodity purchases can be made either before or after the uncertainty is resolved.
There has been relatively little attention devoted to studying optimal income taxation when
both ability diﬀerences and earnings uncertainty are present. A well-known exception is Eaton and
Rosen (1980a). They considered the choice of a linear progressive income tax in a model with two
ability-types and uncertain earnings. Their interest was in learning whether adding uncertainty to
the earnings-generation process would increase or decrease the progressivity of the linear tax. Given
the diﬃculty of obtaining analytical results in even this simple setting, they resorted to a series
of simulations. The results turned out to be agnostic. Depending on the parameters chosen, such
as the degree of risk aversion, adding uncertainty to the standard optimal redistribution problem
with two ability-types could either increase or decrease the optimal linear tax rate. Their models
were exploratory, and they made no attempt to calibrate them to an actual economy. Diamond,
Helms and Mirrlees (1980) also study optimal policy when individuals of diﬀerent ability face
earnings uncertainty. Their policy is also restricted to linear progressive income taxation, and their
uncertainty takes a particularly simple form in which persons are either able or not able to work
in the second period.
There is another, more recent, literature on the eﬀect of uncertainty on optimal redistribution
policy. In the self-labeled new dynamic public ﬁnance literature, the emphasis is on uncertainty
in an intertemporal setting (Golosov, Tsyvinski and Werning 2007; Kocherlakota 2010). Ability
is heterogeneous, but evolves in a stochastic manner period-by-period. In each period, households
choose their labor supply and their saving knowing their current skills, but having only expectations
of their future skills. Much of the emphasis in this literature is on the implications for the taxation of
capital income, with the typical ﬁnding that capital income should face positive taxation, especially
in the case where there are borrowing constraints (Aiyagari 1995; Conesa, Kitao and Krueger 2009).
A lower level of saving makes it more diﬃcult for persons who turn out to be high-skilled to mimic
those with lower skills.
In a related context, Cremer and Gahvari (1995) show that with wage uncertainty, a case
can be made for giving preferential commodity tax treatment to consumer durables. They assume
that ex ante identical households choose their labor supply after the wage has been revealed, and
then allocate their disposable income to many goods. Some goods purchases can be chosen after
wages are known, while others — durables — must be chosen before wage uncertainty is resolved.
Subsidizing the purchase of consumer durables then makes it more diﬃcult for the high-skilled
2to mimic the low-skilled. Our analysis does not touch directly on these issues, since we focus on
uncertainty of earnings that is resolved only after labor is supplied. However, we shall consider the
taxation of consumer durables in our model.
In this paper, we revisit the optimal nonlinear income tax problem in a Mirrleesian setting but
with earnings uncertainty added. The purpose is partly to synthesis and generalize the existing
analysis, and partly to uncover the various inﬂuences that bear on the progressivity of the tax. The
analysis is inherently more complicated than the standard problem of Mirrlees (1971) and than the
pure insurance problem of Tuomala (1984) because there are elements of both settings at work.
These include an equity eﬀect familiar from the standard problem, an incentive eﬀect common to
both problems, and an insurance eﬀect from the pure insurance problem. Our analysis uncovers
how each of these aﬀects the structure of marginal tax rates. The standard approach and the pure
insurance approach naturally emerge as special cases.
The analysis diﬀers from the standard approach in a fundamental way. Because of earnings
uncertainty, a given amount of earnings will be associated with diﬀerent amounts of eﬀective labor
supply by households of diﬀering ability. This implies that we cannot use the standard mechanism
design approach to optimal income taxation because the revelation principle does not apply. The
approach we adopt is analogous to the general principal-agent problem of moral hazard set out by
Mirrlees (1974). To simplify matters, we assume the ﬁrst-order approach can be used, which leads
to some useful restrictions on certain functions along the line proposed by Jewitt (1988), following
Rogerson (1985).
We proceed by setting out the basic model we are using in the next section. This is followed
by solving the government’s optimal redistribution planning problem. The implementation of this
planning outcome using an income tax function is then considered, and the ex ante identical house-
hold case is shown as a special case. Next, an alternative formulation of the problem is considered
which has the advantage of being directly comparable to the standard approach. The standard
approach falls out as a special case of this formulation when risk vanishes. Finally, we conﬁrm that,
when there is more than one consumer good, the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) Theorem continues
to apply with uncertainty, unless some goods must be purchased before uncertainty is resolved.
2 Basic Setting
The economy is populated by a continuum of workers with diﬀerent earning abilities a, distributed
according to F(a) for a 6 a 6 a, with density F0(a) = f(a) > 0 for all a. They are exposed to an
exogenous earnings shock ε that is idiosyncratic and occurs after labor supply or eﬀort ` is decided.
Deﬁne eﬀective labor supply for a person of ability a by z ≡ a`. Actual earnings, denoted by y,
are stochastic and are given by the function y(z,ε), which is increasing in eﬀective labor supply z
and the shock ε. This general form accommodates the special cases where the shock is additive, so
3y = z +ε, or multiplicative, so y = εz. By assumption, the distribution of the wage shock does not
depend on earning ability a.
It is useful, following Tuomala (1984), to invert the earnings function to yield the shock function
ε(y,z), which is increasing in y and decreasing in z. The shock is drawn from the distribution
function G(ε), which given ε(y,z) can be written equivalently as G(y,z), where Gy(y,z) > 0 and
Gz(y,z) 6 0. Thus, given eﬀective labor supply z, G(y,z) is the proportion who earn no more than
y, Gy(y,z) is the density of workers with income y, and Gz(y,z) is the change in the proportion
of workers who earn no more than y as z increases. We assume that the distribution of earnings is
bounded in the sense that for any value of eﬀective labor supply z, there will be an upper bound




= 1, so Gy(y,z) = 0 for all y > y(z). Earnings will also be
bounded below by y(z) > 0. Given that higher eﬀective labor supply leads to higher earnings on
average, we assume Gzz > 0 for y < y(z). In the absence of risk, y = z for certain, so G(˜ y,z) = 0
for ˜ y < z and G(˜ y,z) = 1 for ˜ y > z.
The government can observe realized income y, and imposes a nonlinear income tax function
T(y). It cannot observe a household’s type a or either the actual labor ` or the eﬀective labor z it
supplies. Household disposable income, or consumption, is given by c(y) = y−T(y). For a worker of
type a, a given amount of eﬀective labor supplied z = a` is associated with a distribution of realized
incomes y. This implies that workers of diﬀerent ability-types will end up earning the same income
and will thus be treated alike by the income tax system. There will not be a separating equilibrium
as in the standard optimal nonlinear income tax case, and the usual incentive constraints will not
be binding.
Individual decisions are made before the shock is revealed. Let expected utility for a type-a








Gy(y,z)dy − z/a (1)
where, following Lollivier and Rochet (1983), Weymark (1986) and Boadway, Cuﬀ and Marchand
(2000), we assume for simplicity that utility is quasilinear in labor (or leisure). This utility function
is useful because it isolates individuals’ risk aversion by making it depend only on consumption.
Consider the behavior of a type-a worker. The worker chooses z to maximize v(a) in (1). The

















where the second equality is obtained by integrating by parts.2 The second-order condition is




y u0(c)c0Gzdy = [u(c)Gz]
y
y. Since G(y,z) =
0 and G(y,z) = 1, where y and y are the lower and upper bounds on income, Gz(y,z) = 0 at both
ends.













c0(y)Gzzdy < 0 (3)
We assume the second-order conditions are satisﬁed. Suﬃcient conditions would be c0(y) > 0 and
Gzz(y,z) > 0, which we have assumed above. In principle, c0(y) need not be positive for all values
of y for the second-order conditions to be satisﬁed. Moreover, given that Gz < 0, (2) requires only
that on average c0(y) > 0 for an interior solution, so does not preclude the possibility that for some
values of y, c0(y) < 0. Since the budget constraint faced by all households is c(y) = y − T(y),
c0(y) < 0 implies T0(y) > 1, so the marginal tax rate might be greater than 100 percent at some
income levels without violating the second-order conditions. We return to this possibility when we
investigate the optimal income tax structure.
Note that in the full-information case where the government can observe ability a, the redis-
tributive tax will be based on a and there will be full insurance, or equivalently a 100 percent tax
on income. In this case, c0(y(a)) = 0. This is not feasible with asymmetric information because of
the adverse incentive eﬀect that such a tax would have on eﬀort.





We assume that hy > 0, with hy > 0 for y < y(z). This follows Low and Maldoom, who assume
hy > 0 in their setting with ex ante identical individuals. The property hy > 0 is the so-called
monotone likelihood ratio property (Milgrom 1981), and is one of the suﬃcient conditions that
Jewitt (1988) shows will validate the ﬁrst-order approach to the government’s problem in the next
section. We summarize these assumptions as follows for use later.
Assumption 1: hy > 0 and Gzz(y,z) > 0, with Gzz(y,z) > 0 for y < y(z).
Note, however, that h(y,z), or equivalently Gyz, can be positive or negative. This follows from the
fact that
R
y Gy(y,z)dy = 1, so
R
y Gyzdy = 0. This will be important in interpreting our results
below.
The solution to (2) yields the supply of eﬀective labor z(a), given the tax system in place.



























The second-order condition (3) requires the denominator in (5) to be positive, and the numerator
is positive by (2). This implies the following lemma.
5Lemma 1. Assuming the second-order condition for the worker’s choice of z(a) is satisﬁed, eﬀective
labor supply z(a) is increasing in ability a.
Note that since workers of any type a choose the optimal level of eﬀective labor supply z(a), they
have no incentive to mimic z(a0) for any other type a0 6= a. Therefore, the only incentive constraint
the policymaker faces is (2), which is like a moral hazard condition.
Suppose for simplicity that the government is purely redistributive so has no net revenue




















f(a)da is the number of workers (of all ability-types) earning an ex post in-
come of y. We assume that the population is large enough such that the government budget is
deterministic.
3 The Government’s Optimal Income Tax Problem
We begin by solving the planning solution for the optimal redistribution problem, which involves
the government planner choosing optimal quantities. In the following sections, we consider how this
planning solution can be implemented using a nonlinear income tax. We assume the government is





β(a)v(a)f(a)da, with ˙ β(a) 6 0
The assumption of nonincreasing welfare weights β(a) ensures that the government has some redis-
tribution motive. The government maximizes social welfare subject to its revenue constraint (6),
the deﬁnition of v(a) in (1), and an incentive constraint. We assume that the conditions for a ﬁrst-
order approach to this principle-agent problem are satisﬁed, for example along the lines of Jewitt
(1988). In that case, the incentive constraint for a type-a worker is given by the worker’s ﬁrst-order
condition (2). This is a straightforward constrained optimization problem with government control
variables v(a), z(a) and c(y).
























































3 The use of a weighted-sum social welfare function is for analytical convenience. A more conventional
form would be W =
R
a w(v(a))f(a)da, where w(·) is a concave social utility function. This would give
qualitatively similar results.
6where λ is the shadow value of government revenues, and µ(a) and γ(a) are the type-speciﬁc shadow
prices of individual utility and incentive constraints. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to v(a),
z(a) and c(y) respectively may be written:









































































The variable θ(a) is a modiﬁed version of the Lagrangian multiplier γ(a) on the incentive or moral
hazard constraint of type-a persons. Note that the denominator on the lefthand side is positive
if the second-order condition for the individual’s choice of eﬀective labor supply z(a) is satisﬁed.
Then, using the deﬁnition of the likelihood ratio in (4) and the ﬁrst-order condition (8), condition
























Suppose we normalize the social welfare weights such that
R
a β(a)f(a)da = 1, which is innocuous
since social welfare is simply an ordering. From (12), we can deduce the following proposition. The
proof is in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Assuming
R






The ratio λ/u0(c(y)) is analogous to the marginal cost of public funds in a standard optimal com-
modity tax setting (Atkinson and Stern 1974): the value of an increment of revenue to the govern-
ment relative to an increment of revenue in the hands of an individual. Proposition 1 says that the
expected value of the marginal cost of public funds is unity.
Eq. (12) incorporates all three ﬁrst-order conditions of the government’s problem: (8), (9) and
























7For future reference, let Φ(a,y) ≡
R a
a φ(˜ a,y)d˜ a with Φ(a,y) = 1 and Φ(a,y) = 0, recalling that
a and a are the upper and lower bounds on skills. Thus, Φ(a,y) is the proportion of workers at
income level y who are of ability-type a or less. Given the presumption that higher income levels
draw in higher ability-types, the following assumption is reasonable:
Assumption 2: Φy(a,y) < 0 for a in the interior of the ability distribution.
Note that Φy(a,y) = Φy(a,y) = 0 at the boundaries.













This equation indicates how the marginal utility of consumption varies with income, and takes
into account both the redistributive role of government policy, reﬂected in the social weights β(a),
and the constraint on its insurance role, reﬂected in θ(a), given that redistribution involves moral
hazard. It is useful for subsequent comparisons to rewrite (15) in the following way (omitting



































from uniformity. The second term is an equity term that will be positive for low income
levels where E[β|y] > 1, and vice versa at high incomes. The third term indicates how the incentive
eﬀect varies with income.
We next consider how this planning solution can be implemented in a decentralized economy
using an income tax function. It is useful for what follows to make the following further assumption.
Assumption 3: θ(a) > 0 for all a.
That is, the incentive constraint is binding for all workers. This assumption also implies that an
increase in z(a) increases average tax revenue. To see this, note that the numerator of (11) is the
increase in tax revenue from an increase in z(a), which is positive if θ(a) > 0.5
4 To see this, rewrite (15) using (14) and
R























which is equivalent to (16).
5 The numerator can be written as
R
y T(y)Gyzdy = −
R
y T0(y)Gzdy, with Gz < 0.
84 Marginal Income Tax Rates
As usual, the ﬁrst-order conditions for the planning problem can be interpreted in terms of tax
wedges, or marginal tax rates. The tax liability of a person with income y is T(y) = y − c(y), so
the marginal tax rate is T0(y) = 1 − c0(y), which we assume to be uniquely deﬁned. To determine
the pattern of marginal tax rates in the optimum, we can diﬀerentiate (15) with respect to y. It is
useful to start with a benchmark case in which all workers are ex ante identical, before turning to
the more general case.
Workers Ex Ante Identical
Suppose all workers have the same ability level, which we normalize to a = 1. This corresponds





 = 1 + θh(y,z) (17)
where θ = γ, the Lagrange multiplier on the incentive constraint. As mentioned earlier, h(y,z) can
be positive or negative, so λ/u0 
c(y)

, the marginal cost of public funds, can be greater than or
less than unity at any given income level. Since Proposition 1 still applies, its average value over
all income levels will be unity. Diﬀerentiating (17) with respect to y and using c0(y) = 1 − T0(y),
we obtain (deleting the arguments of functions for simplicity):6














The marginal tax rate depends on three eﬀects, labeled A, B and C. Given that u00(c) < 0 and
hy > 0, all three terms are positive, which implies that T0(y) < 1 in this identical-worker case.
Equivalently, c0(y) > 0 in this case, which guarantees that the second-order conditions for the
workers’ optimal choice of z are satisﬁed. Consider each of the three terms in turn.
The ﬁrst one, A = −(u00/u0)−1 > 0, is the reciprocal coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion and
represents an individual insurance eﬀect. The more risk-averse are individuals, the higher is the
marginal tax rate T0(y), that is, the more insurance the tax system provides to them. Suppose
further that the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion is decreasing in income, as is commonly assumed.
This would work in favor of T0(y) falling with income, though the overall eﬀect depends on what
happens to B and C as income rises.
The second term, B = u0/λ > 0, or B = u0E

1/u0
by (13), reﬂects the marginal utility
of consumption at a given income level relative to its average. The larger it is, the smaller is the
marginal tax rate. It can be thought of as an ex post equity eﬀect, or a social insurance eﬀect, since
6 This is (8) in Low and Maldoom (2004).
9the government puts a higher social value on income of individuals whose marginal utility of income
is higher. Given our assumption that hy > 0, u0/λ is decreasing in income by (17). Therefore,
term B tends to cause the marginal tax rate to rise with income, possibly working against the risk




= λ for all y. At low income levels, u0 > λ, so B works to reduce the marginal
tax rate, and vice versa.
The third term, C = θhy > 0, positive by Assumptions 1 and 3, is an incentive or eﬃciency
eﬀect, given that θ is the shadow price of the incentive constraint and the likelihood ratio h(y,z) =
Gyz/Gy reﬂects the responsiveness of the distribution of outcomes to eﬀort. A higher value of θhy
contributes to a lower marginal tax rate, so less consumption smoothing. Indeed, it is possible that
the marginal tax rate is negative at some income levels, for example, if the coeﬃcient of absolute
risk aversion is small enough. Note that (18) conﬁrms the fact that in the full-information case
where the government can observe ex post wage rates, earnings risk is fully insured. In this case,
the incentive constraint is not binding, so θ = 0, leading to a marginal tax rate of 100 percent.7
In general, the way in which the marginal tax rate changes with income is ambiguous. Following










P − 2 + hyy
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Thus, if P(c(y)) is large enough, the marginal tax rate will be increasing in income. The expression
for P(c(y)) is the ratio of a precautionary eﬀect, reﬂecting the desire of a household to supply labor
for precautionary purposes given the uncertainty of outcomes, to a risk-aversion eﬀect. A relatively
strong precautionary eﬀect leads to increasing marginal tax rates, while strong risk-aversion leads
to declining marginal tax rates. If the utility function exhibits constant relative risk aversion, one
obtains P = 1 + 1/σ, where σ = −u00c/u0 is the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion. Higher σ
reduces P and therefore reduces progressivity.
7 Cremer and Gahvari (1999) show that if all workers are ex ante identical and choose their labor supply
before their wage rate is revealed, the full-information outcome can be achieved if the government can
commit to a punitive enough tax rate for individuals who deviate from full-information labor supply.
Speciﬁcally, suppose that a = 1 for all individuals and z∗ = `∗ is the full-information labor supply.
Let y∗ be the minimum income that can be earned when labor supply is `∗. Then, the government
imposes a tax of T(y) = y − E[y] for all y > y∗, and T(y) = y for y < y∗. Full insurance is provided
for those who choose `∗, while for those with ` < `∗, there is a possibility that c(y) = T(y) − y = 0.
As long as u(0) is suﬃciently low, all individuals will choose ` = `∗. The same result applies to our
model with ex ante identical individuals, though not to our general case with ex ante heterogeneity.
We choose not to emphasize it because we view the ex ante identical case as simply a limiting case of
use for illustrating the intuition of the more general case.
10Workers Differ in Ability
Turn now to the more general case where workers diﬀer in ability a, but face the same distribution

























which can be written in the following form comparable to (18):

































where 1/λ = E[1/u0] by Proposition 1.
The terms A and B are the analogs of the same terms in (18), where there was only one
ability-type. The term C in (20) is simply the expected value of C in (18). These terms have the
same interpretation as in the case where workers are ex ante identical. All three are positive. A
higher value of absolute risk aversion tends to increase the marginal tax rate, while higher values
of deviations from the ﬁrst-best and of the average incentive eﬀect tend to reduce it. These are
intuitive.
The expression for T0(y) in the heterogeneous-ability case diﬀers from the identical-ability
case by the addition of the terms D and E. Term D is an enhanced equity eﬀect, reﬂecting the









This implies that D 6 0 since ˙ β 6 0 and Φy < 0 by Assumption 2. Not surprisingly, the more does
the equity weight β(a) decline with a, the larger is the marginal tax rate.
In the special case of a utilitarian social welfare function, ˙ β(a) = 0, so this term disappears.
In that case, the government’s redistributive objective will be reﬂected solely in term B: marginal
tax rates will be higher for persons with higher incomes (lower values of u0), which will include
disproportionately higher-ability persons. The marginal tax rate in (20) then becomes T = 1 −
8 Proof: Term D =
R











˙ β(a)Φy(a,y)da, with [β(a)Φy(·)]
a
a = 0.
11AB(C + E), where A is an individual insurance eﬀect, B is a social insurance eﬀect and C + E is
an enhanced eﬃciency or incentive eﬀect.
At the other extreme, in the maximin case, the government objective function is W = v(a), so
β(a) = 1 and β(a) = 0 for a > a. The term D then becomes φy(a,y). Given that the distribution
is truncated so there is a maximum income that households earn given their eﬀort, then D = 0
when φ(a,y) = 0, that is, at income levels above the maximum that can be attained by type-a
households. The manner in which D changes as income changes before that maximum is reached
depends on how φy(a,y) changes with y. As shown in the Appendix, if the density function Gy(y,z)
is single-peaked for given z, φy(a,y) might be expected to rise starting at the lowest-income level
and may eventually fall after the mode of density distribution of the type-a worker. In this case, the
term D will inﬂuence the marginal tax rate to fall starting at the lowest income level, and perhaps
rise later on. In the standard case with no uncertainty and under reasonable assumptions about the
ability distribution, the marginal tax rate tends to fall throughout the income distribution under a
maximin social welfare function (Boadway and Jacquet 2008).
The term E =
R
a θ(a)h(y,z(a))φy(a,y)da captures the change in the value of the weight on the
incentive eﬀect when y changes, given that a higher y contains a higher proportion of high-ability
workers. As shown in the Appendix, if the density function Gy(y,z) is single-peaked in y for given
z, which is reasonable, h(y,z(a)) will be negative for low values of y and positive at high values,
while φy(a,y) will be positive for low y and negative for high y. Their product will tend to be
negative, implying, since θ(a) > 0, that E will tend to be negative.
Given that A and B are both positive, the sign of the marginal tax rate will depend on the
relative magnitudes of C, D and E, where the ﬁrst two terms represent the classic trade-oﬀ between
incentives and equity. The equity eﬀect, D < 0, tends to increase the marginal tax rate relative to
the identical-worker case, and this is reinforced by E < 0. There is no guarantee that the sum of
the terms C, D and E will be positive at all income levels. That is, T0(y) could be greater than
one, so c0(y) < 0, for at least some values of y. In an interior solution to the consumer’s optimal
choice of eﬀective labor supply z eﬀort, the average value of c0(y) must be less than one as we have
seen. But neither that nor the second-order condition for the choice of z(a) precludes it from being
greater than one for some income levels. For example, if β(a) is suﬃciently high at low ability-levels
and hy is suﬃciently low, D might be high enough relative to C to make C +D+E < 0. A simple
two-type example is given in the Appendix that shows that the marginal tax rate can be greater
than unity.
In the standard model, a well-known result is that as long as the distribution of skills is
bounded, the marginal tax rate at the top is zero (Seade 1977). Consider the top of the income
distribution in this model. Let y be the maximum level of income that can be earned, given the
12eﬀective labor supply z(a). Given that the distribution G(y,z) is common for all ability-types and
that eﬀective labor supply is increasing in ability by Lemma 1, the income y will only be earned
by the type-a person. Then, φ(a,y) = 1 and φy(a,y) = 0, while φ(a,y) = 0 for all a < a. Using
(20), the marginal tax rate at the top becomes:
















This has the same interpretation as (17) above. Following the same reasoning, T0(y) < 1, but it
can take a positive or negative value.
The same argument can be applied at the bottom. As Seade (1977) has shown, if there is no
bunching at the bottom, the marginal tax rate will be zero there as well (unless the social welfare
function is maximin). Bunching at the bottom can occur either because a non-negative labor supply
constraint is binding for low-ability workers, or because the second-order incentive constraints are
binding. In the absence of bunching at the bottom, the lowest income level, y, will be earned by
those of ability a. An equation similar to (21) will apply for a = a. Again, the marginal tax rate
will be less than 100 percent, but it can be positive or negative.
We can summarize these results for the heterogeneous-household case in the following propo-
sition.
Proposition 2. When households are ex ante heterogeneous, the marginal tax rate is given by (20).
Given Assumptions 1–3, and assuming the distribution of G(y,z) is single-peaked in y, A, B and C
are all positive, D is non-positive and E is generally negative. Marginal tax rates at lower-income
levels will tend to be higher than in the case of ex ante identical households, though not necessarily
at higher-income levels. The marginal tax rates at the top and bottom can be positive or negative.
The marginal tax rate could exceed 100 percent at some income levels.
5 An Alternative Formulation
Further insight can be obtained by reformulating the government’s problem in way that is closer to
the standard deterministic approach following Mirrlees (1971). To do so, we transform the incentive























We use this as our incentive constraint rather than (2). It is analogous to the ﬁrst-order incentive
constraint in the standard Mirrlees optimal income tax problem The endpoints of this diﬀerential





























where z(a) and z(a) are chosen by ability-types a and a to satisfy (2). The Lagrangian func-
tion (7) can therefore be rewritten as follows, using the fact that integration by parts implies
−
R
a π(a)˙ v(a)da =
R














































































˙ π(a)v(a)da + π(a)v(a) − π(a)v(a)
The control variables are now z(a) (including z(a) and z(a)), c(y), v(a) and v(a), while v(a) is a










































−ρ + π(a) = −ρ − π(a) = 0 (26)
β(a)f(a) − ˆ µ(a) + ˙ π(a) = 0 (27)
The following lemma is proven in the Appendix.
Lemma 2. The problems characterized by the Lagrangian functions (7) and (23) are equivalent when
π(a) = −γ(a)/˙ z(a) and µ(a) = ˆ µ(a) − ˙ π(a).
To interpret these necessary conditions, it is useful to begin with the case where there is no
risk.
The Case with No Risk
This alternative formulation reduces to the standard optimal nonlinear income tax case in the
Mirrlees (1971) tradition when risk vanishes. In the absence of risk, eﬀective labor supply and
14earnings are identical, so y(a) = z(a), and consumption for a type-a person can be written c(a).











f(a)da = 0. The incentive constraint (22) still applies.





























where the middle term follows from the individual’s optimal choice of z(a). This is analogous to
the marginal tax rate — or the tax wedge — for this quasilinear-in-labor case derived in Boadway,
Cuﬀ and Marchand (2000).9 The marginal tax rate is decreasing in the skill level a and in the
value of skills af(a), and is increasing in the shadow price of the incentive constraint π(a), which
is negative by Lemma 2, given that γ(a) > 0. The value of π(a) is determined by the ﬁrst-order
condition on v(a), (27), which says −˙ π(a) = β(a)f(a) − ˆ µ(a). It captures the equity eﬀect of the
tax system.
The ﬁrst-order condition on c(y), (25), can be written as follows for y(a) in the interior, using








= Gy(y(a),z(a)) = 0:




Taking the limit of (29) as a → a, we obtain −λf(a)+ ˆ µ(a)u0 
c(a)

= 0. However, evaluating (25)
at a, using (26), yields −λf(a) + ˆ µ(a)u0(c(a)) − π(a)u0(c(a))f(a) = 0. Therefore, π(a) = 0. By a
parallel argument, π(a) = 0. Therefore, by (28), the marginal tax rates at the top and bottom are
zero. Thus, not surprisingly, our problem with risk reduces to the no-risk problem when the risk












The Case with Risk
When earnings are risky, so is the marginal tax rate an individual expects to face. The expected
tax rate turns out to be a straightforward generalization of the tax rate when there is no risk. To



















9 Their equation (12) diﬀers from (28) by having only a in the denominator rather than a2. That is
because they transform their utility function to V (a) = av(a) = au(c) − z. That implies that their
π(a) is equivalent to π(a)/a in our formulation.











This is a straightforward generalization of (28) to take account of risk. It says the expected marginal




, which has the same interpretation as above.10 The
expected marginal tax rates in (31) can follow diﬀerent patterns as in the no-risk model. In the case
of a maximin social welfare function, ˙ π(a) = ˆ µ(a) > 0 by (27) since β(a) = 0 for a > a. Therefore,
given that π(a) < 0, the expected marginal tax rate will be declining in a, as in the standard model
(Boadway and Jacquet 2008).
Equation (31) gives the expected marginal tax rate for a person of type a. We can also derive
an expected tax wedge for a given income level y, which includes persons of diﬀerent abilities. The
ﬁrst-order condition (25) on c(y) can be written as follows, using (14) and (26) and the fact that
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This can be rewritten as follows, after dividing by E[a|y]:
1 −
1













a ˜ aφ(˜ a,y)d˜ a and Ω(y) ≡ π(a)f(a)φ(a,y)/f(a) − π(a)φ(a,y)/f(a).
As can be seen, (32) is a generalization of the no-risk tax wedge in (30) to the case where a
given income can be earned by persons of diﬀering ability. The lefthand side can be interpreted
as the expected or average tax wedge at income level y, taking account that the size of the wedge
varies with ability. The ﬁrst term on the righthand side is analogous to the expected value of the
righthand side of (30), while the term involving Ω(y) takes account of the end-point conditions. It
applies only when uncertainty is present, since π(a) = π(a) = 0 in the no-risk case, so Ω(y) = 0.
With uncertainty, the sign of Ω(y) is ambiguous since π(a) is non-positive by Lemma 2. For those
values of y such that φ(a,y) = 0, Ω(y) 6 0, which works to raise the marginal tax wedge, while
Ω(y) > 0 for y such that φ(a,y) = 0.
We can summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 3. Expected tax wedges under uncertainty are generalizations of the no-risk marginal
tax rate as follows:
10 The sign of π(a) follows from (24),
R
y T(y)Gyz(y,z(a))dy = −π(a)/(λa2f(a)). Assuming that in-
creases in z(a) are revenue-enhancing, this implies that π(a) < 0 in the interior of the ability
distribution.




, is analogous to
the no-risk marginal tax rate, T0(y(a)).
ii. The expression for the expected tax wedge for earnings y, 1 − 1/E[a|y]u0, is analogous to the
expected value of the no-risk marginal tax rate, taking account of the possibility of a non-zero
expected tax wedge at the endpoints.
Finally, as shown in the Appendix, further insight into the expected tax wedge at a given










































> 0, and vice versa. As we argued above, h(·) will tend to be negative where incomes
are low, and positive above that. Thus, at low-income levels, I > 0, so this incentive eﬀect will
tend to increase the tax wedge. At high-income levels, it will lower it. The second term, II, is an
equity eﬀect. It will be larger for higher levels of income, so will tend to cause the tax wedge to
increase with income. It could take on a negative value at low-income levels. Thus, generally the
terms I and II work in opposite directions. As mentioned, the term III takes account of endpoint
conditions. It tends to be negative for low-income levels and positive at high incomes.
The Effect of an Increase in Risk
Eaton and Rosen (1980a) studied whether the addition of uncertainty increased or decreased pro-
gressivity, and found it to be ambiguous even in their simple setting with two ability-types and
linear taxation. Analyzing the eﬀects of an increase in uncertainty in our context would be much
more complicated. We can, however, derive the ﬁrst-order eﬀect of an increase in uncertainty
starting with the no-risk optimum.















Suppose we hold the values of all Lagrange multipliers constant at their no-risk levels, and introduce











0(˜ a)φ(˜ a,y)d˜ a (34)
Take a ﬁrst-order Taylor approximation of T0
0(˜ a) around E[a|y] to yield:
T0










˜ a − E[a|y]
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The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 4 Let a(y) ≡ E[a|y] where a(y) is the inverse of y(a) in the absence of risk. Introducing
a small amount of risk while holding the no-risk Lagrange multipliers ﬁxed raises the expected tax






Of course, this result is both local and approximate since it is derived holding the Lagrange multi-
pliers constant.
6 The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem
Suppose we now allow for two consumer goods in the model. Let c(y) be disposable income, which
can be allocated to two goods, x and q, after the state of the world is revealed. Let ex post utility
from these two goods be given by b(x,q). The overall utility function is still quasilinear in labor,
so the weak separability condition required for the Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) Theorem in the
standard model is satisﬁed. Producer prices for the two goods are unity, and a tax at the rate τ
can be imposed on good x, so its consumer price is 1 + τ.11
Consider ﬁrst the ex post problem of a given household. Once the state is revealed, disposable









, and the indirect ex post









































































11 We can dispense with a tax on good q since proportional taxes on x and q are equivalent to a pro-
portional tax on income so can be absorbed into the income tax. A non-negative value of τ can be
interpreted as a diﬀerential set of commodity taxes on x and q.
18Suppose τ is given, and let W(τ) be the value function of the solution to this problem for the










































γ(a)ucGyzda = 0 (37)









Therefore, the following proposition applies.
Proposition 5. The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem applies if goods purchases are made after earnings
are known.
We have assumed that, although households supply labor before uncertainty is resolved, their
goods’ purchases are chosen ex post.12 Goods of a durable nature, such as housing, might have to be
chosen before earnings are known. Cremer and Gahvari (1995, 1999) have studied this problem in a
setting in which individuals are ex ante identical and subject to wage rate uncertainty, and choose
labor after their wage rate is revealed. They show that if durable goods must be purchased before
wage rates are revealed, the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem does not hold. When the income tax applies
optimally to ex post income, taxing durable goods at preferential rates will be welfare-improving.
To investigate this case in our context, suppose x is a durable good and must be purchased
before earnings are revealed. Good q continues to be purchased after y is known. Now, the individ-
ual must choose both z and x ex ante. Using the same notation as above, the value of transformed











bx(x,c(y) − (1 + τ)x

Gy(y,z)dy − (1 + τ)
Z
y
bq(x,c(y) − (1 + τ)x

Gy(y,z)dy = 0 (38)





that the second-order conditions for the choice of x are satisﬁed, the following is shown in the
Appendix.
12 Cremer and Gahvari (1999) refer to this as the case where households can commit to labor supply,
but not to goods purchases.
19Lemma 3. Assuming the second-order condition for the worker’s choice of x(a) is satisﬁed, ˙ x(a) >
0.













































































































δ(a)uxcGyda = 0 (40)









uxxGydy = 0 (41)
From this we infer the following lemma.14
Lemma 4. Given θ(a) > 0 by Assumption 3, δ(a) > 0 at τ = 0.
That is, the incentive constraint on x(a) is binding for all ability-types.






























a x(a)f(a)da. Using the ﬁrst-order conditions (39) and (40) on x(a) and c(y) and
evaluating (42) at τ = 0, we obtain the following proposition, as shown in the Appendix.






























y uxhGydy = E[uxh|a] = Cov[ux,h] since E[ux|a] = E[h|a] = 0.
14 By Assumption 1, h(y) > 0, and dux/dy = uxqc0(y) > 0. Since both hy and ux are increasing in y,









= uc + ux
dx(a)
dm
represents the change in ex post utility from an increase in income m in all states.
The ﬁrst term is an equity eﬀect. Since x(a) is increasing in a and β(a) is decreasing in a, the
equity term will be negative if Ey[uc|a] is decreasing in a, thereby tending to make τ negative.
The second term involves an incentive eﬀect and can be positive or negative. Thus, the sign of the
optimal tax on x is ambiguous.
Assume, following Cremer and Gahvari (1995, 1999), that individuals are ex ante identical
with a = 1. In this case, x(a) = x so the covariance terms in Proposition 6 are both zero. The
following corollary is apparent.
Corollary 6.1. If individuals are ex ante identical, the optimal tax rate on the durable good is zero,
τ = 0.
This result diﬀers from that of Cremer and Gahvari (1995), who ﬁnd that the durable good should
be taxed preferentially compared with goods purchased after the wage rate becomes known. The
reason is rather subtle, and is as follows. In Cremer and Gahvari, labor supply is chosen after wage
rates are revealed. Persons who plan to mimic low-wage workers in the event that they turn out to
be high-wage will demand less of the durable good than persons who do not intend to mimic. In
these circumstances, subsidizing purchases of the durable good makes it less attractive to mimic,
so the incentive constraint is relaxed. In our model where labor is chosen before uncertainty is
resolved, there is no binding incentive constraint that precludes high-wage persons from pretending
to be low-wage persons so this argument does not arise. Moreover, there is no redistributive reason
for taxing the durable good since all persons are ex ante identical.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have provided a fairly general treatment of optimal income taxation when diﬀer-
ences in income can be due to both ability diﬀerences and uncertainty (luck). We derived a general
formula for the marginal income tax rate and disaggregated its determinants into factors involving
incentive, equity and insurance eﬀects. The cases of no uncertainty and no ability diﬀerences came
out as special cases. We also showed that the Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem continues to be satisﬁed
when earnings are uncertain, as long as goods’ purchases can be delayed until after the state is
revealed.
Our analysis was facilitated by some simplifying assumptions. Preferences were assumed to be
quasilinear in leisure, which eliminates income eﬀects in the demand for consumption. The concept
of risk-aversion is transparent in this case since it depends only on consumption and not on labor
supply.
21We also assumed that labor supply varied only along the intensive margin. Introducing an
extensive margin along the lines of Diamond (1980) and Saez (2002) would involve restricting the
eﬀective labor supply in each job and focusing on participation and job choice decisions, but it
would be a useful extension.
We assumed that the same earnings distribution function applied to the eﬀective labor supply
of all workers regardless of their ability. Allowing earnings risk to vary with ability would be an
interesting extension, although it is not clear what one would assume about the relation between
risk and ability. One could also let risk aversion vary with ability as in Eaton and Rosen (1980a),
though again it is not obvious how attitudes to risk would be expected to vary with ability.
Finally, we assumed that ability was exogenous. There is a substantial literature on abil-
ity being aﬀected by human capital or education investments, and these naturally raise issues of
uncertainty. Seminal papers include Eaton and Rosen (1980b) and Hamilton (1987), and more
recent papers include Anderberg and Andersson (2003), Da Costa and Maestri (2007) and Jacobs,
Schindler and Yang (2010). For a fuller summary of these, see Schindler and Yang (2010).
22Appendix
I. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1



























































a β(a)f(a)da = 1, (13) follows.
The Value of D in the Maximin Case
With a maximin social welfare function, D = φy(a,y). Using (14), we have:
φ(a,y) =
Gy(y,z(a))f(a) R





































If we assume that G(y,z(a)) is single-peaked in y for given z(a), Gyy(y,z(a))/Gy(y,z(a)) is pos-









= 0. This would suggest that φy(a,y) takes a positive and increasing value for low










The Sign of E
Recall that E =
R
a θhφyda. Given that θ(a) is positive, the sign of E will depend on the signs of













23Given z(a), we assume that Gy is single-peaked. An increase in z(a) causes the density function Gy
to shift right. Therefore, Gyz is negative for low values of y and then becomes positive for higher
values, implying that h(y,z(a)) is also negative for low y and positive for higher values.


































= 0. Since we assume that G(y,a) is single-peaked in y for given a, this
would suggest that φy takes a positive value for low y and a negative value for high y. Therefore,
E, which involves the product of h(y,z(a)) and φy(a,y) will tend to be negative over the range of
a, leading to a presumption that E will be negative.
Proof of Lemma 2
Substituting (5) into (9) and using π(a) = −γ(a)/˙ z(a) yields (24).
Substituting µ(a) = ˆ µ(a) − ˙ π(a) into (27) yields (8).















The term involving ˙ π(a) may be partially integrated to yield:
Z
a
˙ π(a)Gyda = −
Z
a





Using π(a) = −γ(a)/˙ z(a), and substituting this into the above equation yields (10).
Derivation of (33)
Using (27), (32) may be written:
1 −
1
























































24which immediately reduces to (33).
Proof of Lemma 3














bx − (1 + τ)bq

Gyzdy = 0
The term multiplying ˙ x(a) is negative by the second-order conditions, and ˙ z(a) > 0 by Lemma 1.
















Since Gz < 0, uxc > 0 and c0(y) > 0, the result follows.
Proof of Proposition 6
Integrating (40) over y, multiplying by x and using
R



























































Since γ(a) = θ(a)f(a) by (11) and µ(a) = β(a)f(a) by the ﬁrst-order condition with respect to



















































































































II. Example where the Marginal Tax Rate Exceeds Unity

























if y > y1
(150)





























































< 0 is a suﬃcient condition for this
demonstration, but it is not necessary. The marginal tax rate will still be greater than 100 percent








. Furthermore, y1 could be endogenous and based
on z(a1) chosen by type-1’s in the optimum.
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